Recently, a set of data exploded in cross-border circles: In just 20 months since launch, Amazon Haul's annual GMV has quietly surpassed $2 billion, and a staggering 97% of active sellers are from China. "Chinese sellers taking over Amazon's low-price store" became a hot topic, but many still question: Isn't this just a low-price trap? Losing money for buzz, what's there to brag about?
If you still hold this view, you are likely missing the biggest structural dividend Amazon will offer in the next three years.
📊 Data Table: Amazon Haul vs. Main Site vs. Temu Key Metrics Comparison
Key Metrics | Amazon Haul | Amazon Main Site (3P) | Temu (Fully Managed) |
Annual GMV Scale | $2 billion (20 months since launch) | Hundreds of billions of dollars | Approx. $20-30 billion (global) |
Chinese Seller Share | 97% (dominant) | 60%-70% (estimated) | Nearly 100% (direct platform connection) |
Average Order Value | $8-12 | $25-35+ | $5-8 |
Seller Net Profit Margin Range | 8%-12% (top supply-chain sellers) | 5%-15% (varies by category) | Extremely thin, reliant on platform pricing & subsidies |
Average Return Rate | 5%-8% (high Prime member trust) | 10%-15% (varies by category) | 15%-20% (impulse purchases on low-priced items) |
Core Traffic Source | Exclusive main site top-level entry + standalone app | On-site search, ads, recommendations | Social media viral, ads |
Traffic Cost Trend | Early dividend period, ample organic traffic | Ad bidding extremely high, continuously rising | Platform controls traffic, sellers have no say |
Logistics Model | Amazon official logistics, some can use FBA | FBA or self-ship | Domestic warehouse consolidation, platform ships |
Suitable Seller Type | Factory-type with extreme supply chain / integrated manufacturing & trade | Brand, boutique, broad-distribution | Pure supply type, no operational autonomy |
1. Low AOV ≠ Low Profit
The table makes it clear: top sellers on Haul already match or exceed the net margins (8%-12%) of some main site categories. Temu sellers have almost no pricing power; platform pricing mechanisms lock in razor-thin margins. Haul gives sellers independent pricing power, testing whether you can squeeze profit from your supply chain rather than passively being forced low.
2. The "return rate moat" is severely underestimated
Many focus only on price and forget costs. Temu's 15%-20% return rate means for every $100 sold, $15-20 is lost to product damage and reverse logistics. Haul, leveraging Prime members' shopping habits, has a return rate of only 5%-8%; this single metric can unlock nearly 10% more net profit margin. That is the real gold mine hidden beneath "low prices."
3. The traffic dividend window is closing
The "exclusive main site entry + ample organic traffic" situation won't last long. As more sellers flood in, ad bidding is bound to begin. The "early dividend period" row in the table reminds everyone: the biggest asset for entering now is not cheapness, but low-cost occupation of category positions and ranking on Haul. Once the advertising system fully rolls out, the cost advantage will disappear.
First, a core fact: Amazon Haul is not a hasty "test field," but Amazon's official counterattack against Temu and SHEIN, even a dimensionality reduction strike. It launched a standalone app and holds a dedicated "Haul" top-level entry on the main site, receiving far more traffic support than ordinary third-party listings. When main site advertising costs are sky-high, Haul, leveraging Amazon's trust endorsement and massive organic traffic, gives early-joining Chinese sellers a long-lost low-cost cold start window. The $2 billion GMV was literally fueled by this traffic.
What does the 97% Chinese seller share indicate? It shows that the most sensitive, most cost-savvy supply chain players have voted with their feet. These sellers are not foolish; a considerable portion are no longer doing "$0.99 free shipping loss-leader" sales. Many leverage Amazon's official logistics and warehousing solutions to position extreme value products in the $10-15 price range. After deducting first-leg shipping, commissions, and returns, they achieve 8%-12% net profit, with even faster turnover than on the main site. Low price does not equal low profit; extreme supply chain efficiency is the real moat.
On the buyer side, Haul shoppers are largely Amazon Prime members making "supplementary purchases," so trust is inherently high, and return rates are far lower than fully managed platforms. Moreover, Amazon explicitly positions Haul as "low-price generic, no brand premium," which gives Chinese factory-type sellers the most comfortable niche—no need to burn cash on branding, just let product quality and price speak.
Of course, not everyone can make money on Haul. Sellers without deep supply chain integration and extreme cost control will indeed feel it is a "low-price trap." The low-price track demands high precision in product selection, deep inventory preparation, and tight first-leg logistics payment cycles, leaving little margin for error. But this precisely proves the problem is not the track but the player. In the $2 billion GMV arena, some lose money clearing inventory while others achieve tens of thousands of orders daily with handsome profits; the 80/20 rule remains unchanged.
What requires more vigilance is the upcoming policy threshold. If the U.S. further tightens the de minimis exemption (T86) for packages under $800, it will inevitably push up Haul's logistics and tariff costs. But this Sword of Damocles also hangs over Temu and SHEIN. When that happens, those with overseas warehouse stocking and compliant customs clearance capabilities will pull further ahead on Haul. Amazon has signaled that it will allow some Haul sellers to use FBA inventory—an almost open hint: the future low-price marketplace will evolve into a hybrid model of "local fulfillment + low-cost direct mail," making the first-mover advantage of Chinese sellers even more obvious.
So, stop crudely defining Amazon Haul as a "low-price trap." It is more like a brutal touchstone: for those without supply chain depth, it is a pit; for Chinese sellers who have compressed costs to the extreme and excel at capturing traffic dividends, it is definitely a new golden track. The $2 billion GMV is just the beginning. With 97% of players already in the game, standing by with bias is your biggest opportunity cost.

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