Author | Fei @AMZ123

Statement | This article is copyrighted by AMZ123 and may not be reproduced without permission.

In recent years, Youke Tree has not been living up to its reputation.

Lawsuits, litigation, and arbitration have been continuous, regulatory inquiries have been round after round, and the industry's reputation has slipped from being a "first-generation big seller benchmark" to a "restructuring sample plagued by negatives."

The belated release of the third-quarter financial report once again lays bare the company's current real situation.

For a listed company, "late release" itself is information.

AMZ123 learned that on January 27, Shenzhen's big seller Youke Tree disclosed its 2025 third-quarter report. The financial report shows that in the third quarter of 2025, revenue was 16.3833 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 83.59%; revenue for the first three quarters was 58.9567 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 82.02%.

The profit side is also under pressure: The net profit for the third quarter was -15.7298 million yuan, and the loss continued to expand.

Regarding the decline in performance, Youke Tree explained in the report that the main operating entity of cross-border e-commerce is still under significant financial pressure, and the continuous decline in the sales scale of cross-border e-commerce business is the cause.

This explanation is not surprising. The essence of cross-border e-commerce is a business of cash flow and turnover efficiency. When funds are tight, investment often contracts first, inventory becomes more conservative, turnover speed slows down, and scale decline is usually the result of a chain reaction.

However, further analysis by the industry believes that "financial pressure + scale decline" may just be the surface, and there are at least three forces superimposing and squeezing from behind.

First, the tug-of-war over control rights has slowed down the pace of operations.

After Youke Tree went through bankruptcy reorganization in 2024, the founder camp and the new shareholder camp confronted each other multiple times over board seats and control rights transfer, with temporary shareholder meetings and board changes being repeatedly debated.

With unstable control rights, asset injection, organizational adjustment, and business contraction are difficult to advance decisively, ultimately manifesting as "unable to stop bleeding when needed, unable to focus when needed," and the scale can only passively decline.

The company's previous delays in disclosing the third-quarter report on the grounds of "unfinished financial data handover" were also seen by the industry as a manifestation of internal strife spilling over into business and financial work progress.

Second, the superposition of litigation and regulatory pressure has further tightened financing and cooperation space.

As control rights conflicts became public, mutual lawsuits escalated, and external regulation quickly intervened. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued consecutive inquiry letters and regulatory letters, pointing out issues such as "obstructing shareholder rights exercise and information disclosure violations"; at the end of September 2025, the China Securities Regulatory Commission also issued a case filing notice, initiating an investigation into Xiao Siqing, Wang Wei, and Tianxing Cloud.

For cross-border companies, the superposition of such litigation and regulatory risks affects not only public opinion but also quickly transmits to funds and cooperation: financial institutions become more cautious in credit extension, cooperation terms become harsher, suppliers and service providers tend to shorten payment terms or even demand cash on delivery, further compressing corporate cash flow flexibility.

Third, the credit chain has "hard landed" at the supply chain end, and pressure has begun to spill over into real recovery efforts.

As mentioned in a previous AMZ123 article, the nearly 100 million yuan arbitration with Qianhai Yuntu is a typical signal: when partners no longer accept "negotiated delays" but lock in claims through arbitration, the company's cash flow maneuvering space will be further compressed.

For an entity with only 58.9567 million yuan in revenue for the first three quarters and 16.3833 million yuan in revenue for the third quarter alone, this level of recovery will directly counteract business recovery.

Therefore, this third-quarter report conveys not just "ugly numbers," but also a reality: the business scale has shrunk to the point where it is difficult to cover both organizational costs and supply chain credit simultaneously, and the company is being pushed into a vicious cycle of "smaller scale, tighter credit, harder operation."

It is worth mentioning that along with the 2025 third-quarter financial report, Youke Tree's "renaming plan" was also disclosed.

AMZ123 learned that Youke Tree recently issued a notice stating that the company plans to change its name to "Xingyun Technology."

To the outside world, this renaming is more like a farewell: the first-generation big seller who built its reputation with the name "Youke Tree" is exiting the stage.

It is worth noting that this renaming is not a temporary decision but has come to a "necessary step" following a series of previous changes.

First, the governance level has completed a "change of personnel."

In October 2025, after the company's board of directors completed its early election, it immediately announced that core management members such as founder Xiao Siqing, General Manager Xiao Yan, and She Chan had left their positions, with the founding team largely exiting management and decision-making levels.

For the market, this is not just a management adjustment, but a new stage where the company moves from the founder era to one dominated by the new shareholder camp.

Next, the brand level completed a "brand change."

After the founding team's exit, the company chose to appear externally with the new name "Xingyun Technology," signifying a simultaneous switch in external narrative and market communication tone.